Black Box: In the Background of Scientific Discoveries
Jan: Okay, so yeah, I'm Jan Slaby. I'm a
professor of philosophy in Berlin at
the Free University, the area of philosophy of
mind. My interests lie mainly in the
intersection of the social and the mental, so
what I call at times "a political
philosophy of mind", and in this
perspective you ask how specific living
conditions, institutions, technology,
social practices, media intersect with
our individual mentality, our
subjectivity, how subjectivity is
basically formed. So it's really
a perspective that wants to
understand the human subject in its time,
in its specific social setting. So
that's where philosophy probably
intersects with a lot of other
disciplines like social science, cultural
studies and anthropology and so on. And
of course, it is an interesting, I hope,
perspective on the way certain sciences,
fields in the cognitive sciences, are
relevant to how the mind actually works
and .. I think, Aljoša, you
are interested in similar topics because
you're also a philosopher, so maybe we can
kind of agree quite early on
that we are in a specific relation to
cognitive science and the mind sciences.
Probably not a relation of
wholehearted endorsement, more of a
skeptical critical position, probably a
certain distance to these fields, while
we are still in a way interested in them
fascinated by them ... Maybe that's
the first question to you also,
after you introduce yourself, how your
specific relationship is to cognitive
science and the neuroscience, maybe the
brain and the brain science. I
can also tell you a little bit about my
specific take here. But I don't want
to speak too long at the beginning, so
I'm eager to learn what your
perspective is. Aljoša: My name is Aljoša Kravanja
and I'm currently
a researcher in fields of criminology and
philosophy and I also
work as a translator, mostly from
French. The projects that I've been
currently working for is of course my
thesis that I just finished, just a few
months ago, on the philosophy of Immanuel Kant
and, yeah, that's basically it.
I think that Kantian philosophy and
philosophy of German idealism do have a special
relationship to neuroscience, because at the
first glance, they're dealing with a
common topic. You know, subjectivity. But
from two completely opposite or
different viewpoints, so I'm kind of
professionaly inclined to be critical
towards neuroscience and cognitive science,
absolutely. And I think I'll try to
overcome it somehow by
thinking about it,
not only in critical terms.
Jan: On Kant: that's a whole universe. Aljoša: Yes.
Jan: Was it on the Critique of Pure Reason,
was it on the theoretical philosophy, or
something else?
Aljoša: I've written my thesis on Critique of
Judgment, and the main reason is
that I actually tried to sidestep
main theoretical issues of Kantian philosophy.
Because Critique of Pure Reason is,
I think, justifiably read
as the main critique of the three works.
But yeah, so that's the main reason
I wrote my thesis on the Critique of Judgement.
There are actually two paragraphs or
short segments in Critique of Judgement
that have been
read very widely by people such as Schelling
or Hegel, those are paragraphs 76 and 77 and
basically what I've done in my
thesis is, I analyzed those two
paragraphs kind of very deeply
and that's that. Jan: Well that's
far removed from much of what you get in
neuroscience for sure.
It always strikes me on what
high a conceptual level Kant was actually
working. And as philosophers we kind of, we
can grapple all our lives with just 50
pages of his work, I would say. Or with
just the concept of understanding, or the
concept of judgment. I mean, Kant's
theory of judgment is amazing from
today's perspective and also so little
understood in many quarters of
philosophy. And then going from there to,
you know, to all the big claims about the
brain and about how neuroscience can now
understand how decision-making, for
instance, works or how well also certain
perceptual judgments are arrived at. That can
be quite hard and that was
part of my way into a critical
perspective on neuroscience. Some of this
discrepancy in terms of the level of
understanding that is actually reached
on the one side and then the
exaggerated appearance of
neuroscientists in today's climate where
science has a certain high standing in
society, regardless of whether people
understand what the science is actually
about, or how it actually works to have
a study in neuroscience that actually has
any results and that actually tells us
anything about, well, mental phenomena. And,
well, all these difficult processes are
really hardly understood but still
there's some sort of default credibility
lent to all of the, well, narratives or
results or whatever comes out of
neuroscience and that can make it
quite difficult to, well, to
position yourself as a philosopher
outside of the narrow circles of the
Kant insiders or Hegelians or so
on so. Has it been an issue for you
during your studies or during
interaction in university or was it not
a problem that you live in a time, where
neurocognitive sciences seem so prominent
culturally? Aljoša: Yeah, I think that, yeah, I
think it's a broader problem, I guess not
only limited to, of course, to my
situation, that the scientific
and mostly philosophical projects that get
funding, that get the state funding,
usually have to be
concerned with neuroscience. Or they have
to be termed in the framework of neuroscience.
So, for instance, it's more likely to
get state funding if you frame
a project in criminology
in neuroscientific terms
than in, you know, conventional terms of
criminology. So, of course as you know most
likely, the same is with philosophy. It's
harder to get a state funded project that
deals only with Kant or with German
idealism. You have to add that, you know,
neuroscientific part. And the problem is
of course that this is usually just,
you know, just an artificial add-on for
something. It really doesn't
concern the actual theory that you're dealing with.
So yeah, I think that neuroscience,
not as a science, but rather the
standings
it has in society, is problematic in this view.
Jan: Yeah, well, that was part of what a
few collaborators and I thought a few
years ago, that we can take neuroscience
actually as an angle or as a
a topic to investigate the current
situation of,
well ... What it means to be human today or
what it means to do research on the
human. So you could kind of turn the
tables on your signs a little bit and
take it as a test case of how certain
types of knowledge are produced in this
specific setting. Like how, for instance,
some studies are just done because they
will generate public impact. Like work on
the adolescent brain or work on the
criminal brain. You could
be sure that, well, there will be
some sort of uptake and you will get
funding for it and so on and also
work on, well, the alleged
non-existence of freedom of the will,
that we are all determined and so on, or that
there's some programming in
the brain that is from the stone age. So
there are all these kind of shared nice
narratives there that, I don't know,
the public can understand. But when
you, when you try to investigate
neuroscience and such, you kind of see
how knowledge production in neoliberal
times actually works. And I don't mean
this in the sort of shady blame game
type of thing, but rather ... You can really
see also how professional scientists are
forced to channel their topics and also
the whole outlook of their research
groups through these discourses. And
there are various examples, like work on
empathy
it's a big industry. Social
cognition and empathy, where you
see that. And that's really
interesting work to be done here, also
in social psychology. But it always has
to be kind of framed to a certain
template to make it, I don't know, timely,
to make it understandable. And
that's kind of interesting because you
see that there are... I think there are a lot
of, kind of well-meaning people, of
course, in neuroscience but they have
to play by these
rules of framing the topics in
specific ways. And at the same time you
see these discourses. How all these
specific discourses about subjectivity,
how our time actually understands people,
how people should be governed, how, well...
What image of education do you have,
what image of child-rearing
do you have, what image of
dangerous subjects do you have and what
sorts of policies are put forth. And you
can kind of always see, it is almost a
Hegelian sense, you see how neuroscience
encapsulates some sort of
essence of our time in these
entanglements with different practices.
And I think that that was our attempt to
kind of turn the tables and take
critical neuroscience as a way to
do philosophy of our time. So it kind
of mixes philosophy of science and
critique of science with a kind of a
more sociologically diagnostic approach
to the present. And I think that's
one way to, as a philosopher, to kind of
keep your sanity in and of
these developments. Aljoša: So you think that
neuroscience is like naturally
compatible with
neoliberalism? Jan: Well, in some respects I
think it's kind of a poster child of
neoliberalism on various levels.
For one, the way it has taken up certain
discourses. Well, you could talk about
networks, brain networks and network
subjectivities. You could speak about
human capital theory. How there's this
certain background discourse in
neuroscience where, which is about,
well, the resources, the potentials that
an individual has and that you can
cultivate in order to have it marketable
and ready for you. And I think this
is the discourse that kind of one-to-one was
adopted by neuroscience. Also in the
in the whole discussion of
neuroplasticity.
The message is: "Well, your brain is
not hardwired, but you can make it better
if you can cultivate it. And it's
flexible, it makes you kind of have to be
a network individual in the workplace
and so on." And I wouldn't say that it's
kind of a
straightforward adoption, but it's a
sort of tested osmosis of
discursive elements.
Aljoša: I think that coincidences played much role in
my interest in Immanuel Kant.
The fact is that in Ljubljana we have
quite a strong school of
Kantian and also Hegellian
interpretation. We have scholars such as
Žižek, Mladen Dolar and Alenka Zupančič,
Rado Riha, Zdravko Kobe,
who are well-known not only in Slovenia, but
also abroad. So I think that in Slovenia,
or at my Faculty of Arts, it's
kind of natural that if you want to do philosophy
seriously, then you study Kant or Hegel.
It's a kind of a convention.
And the reason why I chose Critique
of Judgment as my topic of
the dissertation is the one I
mentioned earlier, because I wanted to
sidestep the main theoretical issues
and deal with those more marginal problems of
Kantian philosophy. But like on the
more general level, the reason why I
write my articles
is because I just want to
figure things out. You know, because I like
to see how concepts interact and then perhaps
present that conceptual interactions in a way
that is enjoyable to other people.
And I think that is my main motivation
of production.
Jan: These are great answers to the very
difficult question for a philosopher,
"What is the motivation?" I mean there's
always a sort of general thing that you
want to figure things out for humanity
or what it means to be human and
i think that this is a general level of
a very deep motivation that
probably makes you a philosopher. But
then of course you were a child of your
times and we already spoke about
neuroscience and
the kind of urge to respond to
developments that we find problematic. So
there's a sort of critical impulse
and so for me part of the motivation has
always been this squaring these two
things. Like there's a legacy of
philosophy where you have authors from
2,500 years ago that kind of speak to us
still and tell something about human
nature or about what it means to be human,
but at the same time we know that we
live in a time where things are
radically different than anytime
before in history. And it is
probably a very dangerous time also
politically and so and philosophy has,
I think, this urge to kind of respond to
what's going on out there in the
world of politics and in history. So, and
of course it's very difficult to bring
these aspects together. But on
the other hand it's obvious that when
you read Kant, for instance, or Aristotle,
that they speak directly not only to a
perennial dimension of what it means to
be a rational being,
but they kind of directly address our
political nature and address an ethos
in each of us, and a sort of
rationality. And sometimes, although we
tend to be kind of pragmatic about our
decisions and we have to navigate
complex institutional landscape, there's
still sort of fascination in
philosophy to square human nature on the
one hand, or the nature of being
a rational being, with addressing the
concrete historical time in which we are
living.
Jan: And I think that's one of the
questions I think you wanted us to
address. The way that our research is
responding to the current situation,
politically, historically or whether we
are just imersed in academic affairs. And
I think all off our answers point in this
direction that
these things go together. But it's
always uneasy. It's always an uneasy
interaction between the vagaries of the
day and what philosophy is about
conceptually. So I wonder how you, how
you respond to this challenge of being
up to your time and at the same
time standing in this perennial
conversation of philosophy? Aljoša: Yeah, I think that fundamentally
there are two ways that philosophy can
address the problems of
its time. One is to see in what is
actual, in what exists today, a particular
case of already known general
philosophical notions. And the other way which is,
I think, fundamentally different is that
philosophy can understand its own
actuality or contemporary existence and
society as case of something new, that
has to be thought in a radically new way.
I think that philosophers
are naturally
inclined to see, to actually think in the
first way. You know, to see what is
actual merely as a particular case for
general philosophical notions. And you know,
you see Trump and you see Trump's victory
or Brexit and you say: "A-ha, look.
There's a return of the
notion of sovereignty," or something like that.
Or you can
sidestep that inclination and
try to think of things
as something radically new. The
second way perhaps is harder, but
philosophers such as Michelle Foucault or Hannah Arendt
tried to, explicity tried to go that way.
And I think that, yeah, we should follow
their example. Jan: Maybe there's a
middle way when you when you see how the
philosophical ethos probably is affected
by the current climate. So it's not really...
It must not be on the
level of contents, concepts, questions you
ask, but probably on the way that you
position yourself or the way that you ...
what issues you find suddenly
urgent. I mean, there was a time in the
nineties when I was trained and
analytical philosophy, people were kind
of happy to to talk about very tiny
conceptual issues that were of no
relevance whatsoever, you could say, to
general human affairs. And you could
say, well, at least in the West it was the
kind of time when people were well-off
and the big problems seemed to be settled,
you know, and it was sort of boring time
where people had time to you know
consume or do intricate little things
for their passions. And now that has
changed a little bit, I think. Now there's,
I see it in my students, they are very eager
to address topics of political relevance.
Be it in terms of race or the rise of
populism. I work a lot on emotion and
affect and it was also a long time in
philosophy where emotion theory was kind
of boring. It was about, well, media
amplified political affect, it's about
hatred, it's about climate of fear, the
way we find things relevant. And also
how, on what level you formulate your
philosophical question, so maybe that's a
that's another factor.
Well speaking of the topic of,
speaking of affect, have you ever thought
about affect or emotion in your
philosophy or is that something that you
have never thought about? Aljoša: Well, a few years ago I
actually wrote an article about Dostoievsky
and the notion of
suffering, which was
dealing mostly with affectivity.
And I found the philosophy
of Michel Henry extremely interesting
especially in this view. But yeah,
what I noticed this year while dealing
with Critique of Judgement is how Kantian
take to the notion of affectivity in
Critique of Judgement is actually now always
secondary. Like, you have this first layer,
which is the layer of judgment, and then only
secondary perhaps Kant's analyses
get to the analysis of affectivity. Yeah,
I found that quite interesting and this is
perhaps the general problem with
Kantian thing. Jan: Yeah, we should not go there, otherwise we
would use all our time speaking about
Kant's theory of judgment.
I think one point that we are expected to
address is creativity and thought, and I
think we also, I would say we have talked
about that already, that the way I
think creativity happens, at least for me,
is often about responding to
things that kind of concern my wider
circle of influence. So it's about what
happens in conversations, what happens
with people that are, well, show up in
seminars or at workshops. So that's an input
but of course it's always a difficult
question for philosophers to ask about
what the sources of your creativity are.
And I kind of, I'm almost a little
embarrassed by this question apart from,
you know, all these sort of trivialities
about, "Oh well, yeah, it's
conversing with people and, well,
sometimes we are kind of reading a big
philosopher and we get inspired." But I think
I don't really know what makes
me, the little creativity I have, I
don't know where it comes from actually,
so maybe you have a better answer?
Aljoša: Yeah, I noticed a general pattern,
at least in my writing, that
like my most general creative
process is, starts, begins usually with
discovering an interesting idea. An idea that
at least at first sight seems interesting to me.
Then when I start
writing about it, then I usually find
out that that idea is actually crappy
or, you know, false or a new stereotype.
And then what I
actually write about is precisely the
reason why that first idea is crappy,
you know. And I think that that is the most general
work process, at least for my work,
that perhaps all the others might recognise with
them as well. Jan: That sounds
plausible. We kind of litter our way with
mistakes and errors and wrong turns,
and, yeah. Maybe that's really different
in philosophy than in
other fields but I am not sure.
Jan: Well, the public. That's a, that's our
topic, and I mean. I guess, it's again
an answer that we have to give here
that is kind of mixed and balanced and
and says, well, on the one hand
we are funded by the public,
most of us if we are happy enough for the job,
and the public has some sort of right
to see what we're up to and of course
our interventions, particularly
when they are critical and political,
they should have an impact. And so I can
easily tell people why I critique
neuroscience because I think the real
waste of money happens here, when you
have a research program that is funded
by billions and billions. Think of the
Human Brain project of the EU. It's
1 billion euros or so for the next 10
years. And I think it's very important to
make people understand that there is a
lot of problematic stuff going on in
science. And also to explain people that
it's normal that science takes risks, but
also takes wrong turns and that there's
an institutional dimension to it, that there's
a political dimension to it, and you need
to have an assessment of that, and then
at some point say, well, "Probably the
funding is misdirected here," or "We
would be very cautious about the results,"
and so on. So I think that's a
straightforward case where I think the
public can follow what we do, even people
that are not trained. In other parts of
philosophy that is more difficult. I mean,
talking about people while we inquire
into the nature of agency or
subjectivity in this sort of very
detached theoretical terms, it... i think
it's very, that there are lots of
mediated steps in between before these
issues that Kant probably grapples with
or that contemporary Kantians grapple
with, until they arrive at a point where
you can make arguments that the public
needs to respond to that. Maybe as
a Kantian, when you look at The
Contest of the Faculties or something
like that. When Kant defends the
importance of freedom for the unfolding
of rationality in a public sphere. Maybe
that's the point where you can say, well,
"Every member of the public
should be interested in that because
without it there wasn't
any sort of public anymore." So maybe you have
your take on that?
Kant is a versatile weapon.
Aljoša: Yeah, I think I really feel in the sense of...
I also think that as a philosopher that
is or at least that was funded by the
public, I do have some obligation to
present my findings in a, you know,
accessible way. In a way that is not
accessible only to professionals. Because,
like, the main output or perhaps the
only output of philosophy is of couse words.
The output of natural sciences or technical
sciences are results. You know, results
in form of concrete objects. But philosophy
in the last instance produces
words. And it is, I think, very hard if not
impossible to justify publicly funded with
philosophy that is only, you know, that's
accessible to professionals only.
And that is the case that is,
yeah, greatest and can be seen in
studying Kant, absolutely yeah.
So I agree with you. But on the other hand,
Kant himself
in The Contest of Faculties stated that the
Faculty of Arts and philosophy
in particular has an inherent relation
to the public as such, and so is
in a sense necessary for you. But if a
philosopher said or proposed such a
claim, you know, in a public space
that the public itself is in a way
dependent on him, it's, you know, an
outrageous claim in the last instance.
And philosopher,
he or she should not expect that the public
will receive that claim well, I think.
Jan: Yeah that's right. Well, we could talk all
night about Kant, I guess. I mean the
thing is you have Kant's deduction of
the categories,
I mean, the transcendental deduction and
that's probably one of the most
complicated pieces of philosophy ever to
be written down. So the thing is, you
could say, well, we need people to be
experts on this, you know, but you
cannot expect from them to kind of
really relate what's in there to
something that, you know,
a shopkeeper around the corner needs to know.
But on the other hand it's, I mean ... That's,
that's the thing. The wager is that
it's about human understanding, the human
subjectivity, so the very core of what we
are. And it's kind of not surprising that
it's a riddle and that it's
very difficult. And so I think we have to
find a way just to convey to people what
is that game that Kant is playing, while we
shouldn't probably play it in a way that
everybody can follow, because that
is probably impossible. We could kind of
present to people what the stakes are of
this sort of philosophy. And then there's
some, that it matters how we think about
ourselves as, well, self-determined,
potentially irrational, free individuals,
and what that means. Or what
would it mean to not think of ourselves
in these terms, but kind of to deny
freedom, to deny autonomy, to deny the
possibility of self-determination,
what would that mean?
So, uhm, but I don't know. Maybe Kant
is a good topic to settle on
here. Because it kind of carries this
understanding of,
well yeah, what it means, why is it a
good idea to be a rational being, even
though it's hard. Aljoša: Absolutely. Kant is
interesting here also
because he himself was not only a
professional philosopher but also an author of, you know,
popular essays written about
everything from human races to yet
politics and reading habits. So I
think Kant himself is in a way an example
of how a philosopher even today, I think, you know,
may present his philosophical
findings also in
an accessible way. Jan: Right
yeah and that's why I would
understand my own project also as a
Kantian project in a certain sense of
critique. And the concept of,
Kant's concept of critique is
very complex, of course, but there's also
the sort of straightforward sense of
critique, namely that there's so much
bullshit around. And you can, if you have,
if you have a personal
understanding at some point, you
have probably an obligation to tell
people what is bullshit out there. And
well, that's some of what I, we have
tried to do with certain concepts like
empathy, like resilience, like, I don't
know, neuroplasticity, that there are
certain things that are kind of exported
from science into the public, that are
really, well, either incoherent or
problematic or politically one-sided or...
In terms of the concept of
resilience, which is, that embodies a
whole worldview of, about subjects that
struggle for self-preservation and try
to get ready for catastrophe. And there's
a whole outlook in which the world seems
to be on the verge of catastrophe and so
on. But on the other hand, the term is
promoted by certain agencies that kind
of want a specific type of subject. So,
and I think that's actually kind of a
straightforward sense of critique of
enlightening people about what's
actually in this concept and why it is
probably not such a good idea to
promote it in that in that way. And I
think that's still in a broader
sense a Kantian endeavor.
Aljoša: Additional problem is that, you
know, that public will, especially today I
think, always ask you back: "Who are
you to tell us what is bullshit?"
I think that there is a general
resentment towards, exactly towards
professionals that try, you know, to
determine what is bulshit and what is not
bullshit.
For instance, let's take the
term "fake news" that has recently, you
know came to the front.
I think that this term is in
itself a bit patronising, you know, to the
public, and the public of course
quickly recognized that. And I
think that especially today
the task of public critique performed by
philosophers or
intellectuals in general is, you know, how should I
put it, at risk, you know? Or perhaps less
effective than it was in nineties, I think,
or in eighties. And I think that
that has something to do with
the internet. You know, with communication being
accessible to everyone and professionals
not having privileged
voice in discussion. So I think that
today the task of critique is hard.
Jan: Yeah, it's hard. But I mean, I wonder what do
you think is a right response to
that situation? Would you say that
philosophers just have to go on doing
what they do because they know that they
are doing the right thing? Or would you say
that because the parameters, the whole
outlook of the public sphere has changed
because of the internet, that we have to
change our ways, our practices, the
way we address the public, the modes of
communication, habits of publication and
so on?
What would you think? I'm very interested
in that.
Aljoša: Yeah, that's a hard question.
But I think that the most general
strategy should be that
public intellectuals should not present
themselves as professionals, but rather
as someone actually from
the public or from the people. Because
the main reason, I think, that
professional speech today produces
so much resentment is that people,
that because intelectuals present
themselves as
professionals. And that, I think, naturally
produces resentment reaction. So
yeah, I think the general strategy is that
intellectuals should avoid
presenting themselves as intelectuals.
Jan: Okay, well, I see where you're
driving it, but it's a slippery
slope, of course. I mean you cannot,
you cannot completely hide your education,
your status, your standing and so on.
Although I see what you're driving it.
I think what part of the point might be
to use all sorts of venues for
communication. Not only the official
interview or the newspaper article and
all these, you know, big stages where
professors usually speak from, but rather
engage in all sorts of informal
communication channels, but then make
sure that you are kind of doing what you
always did. Namely, be a critical voice.
Be a voice of reason and be consistent in
that and not kind of, you know, faking it
a little bit in order to be
better perceived.
Jan: For me the best way to work
collectively was usually a partnership
with one individual. Like, two people
writing a paper. Or two people, maybe
three, but mostly two people that
kind of have some overlap in their
intuitions or in their
intentions, and then find a common ground.
But you cannot do it all the time,
because then you have to move on to do
something on your own or find someone
else for a different interest. So I have
a rather big network of co-authors. And
sometimes I see them only, like, for
one week a year. We do a little thing and
then, you know, do something together, and
I don't see the person for another year
and so on. But that's great because at
some point you have a certain... There are
certain ideas that resonate with certain
people, although you don't have much in
common with these people. And so I always
look for these sort of alliances. It's
not the same as a scientific research
group where people are hired in the same
lab and interact every day, and that's
more difficult probably. I don't know.
Aljoša: Yeah, I also think that writing
philosophy in co-authorship is actually quite
hard, because, like, the main
thing that philosopher,
the main principle that philosopher has to follow
is consistency. And you don't,
you can't be consistent with someone
else. You can only be consistent with
yourself. And I think that
philosophy in that view is... Writing philosophy
in co-authorship is, in that view, quite hard because, like,
philosophy doesn't have this external
object that various authors can, you
know, agree upon,
but rather, it produces text and that
text has to have its own internal
consistency and I actually don't
imagine how I would write philosophy
with someone else.
Jan: Interesting, yeah. I know, I mean,
two things about that. It's always easier
when you do it in terms of the text that is
more sociological or legal. And in
neuroscience we had a lot of texts that were,
probably you could say they're science and
technology studies in the broader sense.
That was a little easier because you
could kind of divide the text up
into sections and if the sections were a
little different nobody really cared.
In philosophy you really have to look
for a person who shares an intuition
about a topic. So, and often there are people
that I I know quite well, where I think,
okay, we disagree on a lot of things but
here there's a point in Aristotle where
we agree on a certain concept and we
just write a paper on that concept and
it's still difficult. But then I think we
meet on a certain common ground -- and you
need a lot of conversation to find the
common ground -- but then it can be great
fun. And also I'm a lazy person. I like
it when someone else writes my papers and
I can send them half of the paper and
they, yeah. Philosophy can have a
characteristic motivation problem when
you're on your own all the time. It can
be really tiring. And because writing
is also, it's a hard process, I guess,
for most people, and if there's someone
else who can kind of pick up the slack
from time to time
it's great. Thanks.
Goodbye! Aljoša: Goodbye.
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