Youtube News: Youtube daily report Jul 22 2017

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Bachatas 2017 Lo Mas Romanticas - Romeo Santos, Prince Royce, Shakira - Bachata Nueva 2017 - Duration: 1:00:35.

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For more infomation >> Bachatas 2017 Lo Mas Romanticas - Romeo Santos, Prince Royce, Shakira - Bachata Nueva 2017 - Duration: 1:00:35.

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Reggaeton Mix 2017 - Maluma, Nicky Jam, CNCO, Ricky Martin, Gente De Zona , Play N Skill - Reggaeton - Duration: 1:12:30.

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Shakira, Maluma, Nicky Jam, Daddy Yankee, J Balvin, Piso 12, CNCO, Chayanne - Pop Latino Mix 2017 - Duration: 1:00:18.

Hello friends ! If you like this mix please Like & share, sub channel. Thanks you very much !!

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Quelques mots - Madeleines Vidéoludiques - Duration: 5:12.

For more infomation >> Quelques mots - Madeleines Vidéoludiques - Duration: 5:12.

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133 AZBE HS6 DIMPLE GANZUADO SPP & GUTTED SUB ENG - Duration: 8:12.

Hello guys, welcome back

Today I have for you this dimple lock

AZBE

six pinner, is the model HS6

It is not a difficult lock to open

only key way, I show you ...

with lots of guards

they are close together

and without proper pick ...

You may have some difficulty

with a pick that is handled well there, there is no problem

This would be the key

I have already removed the clip to gut it more easily

As you can see works perfectly

I show coding

first, second and third are very long, in fact, second and third virtually are set from the begining

fourth is very short

right behind them, try not to overset them

and fifth and sixth are of medium length, pose no problem

the fourth also is the shortest, has not cut

It is a spool, and is the only one who can pose some problems when setting

but as I say with proper pick there is no difficulty

we will try opening and if we do we will gut it

and we see what is inside

Let's go there

I will use a commercial tension wrench

thereit is

and this home made pick

There, now he has focused

This pick is made with wiper washer rod

and can be handled smoothly between guards

we go there, from front to back

first nothing

second makes a click

third a slight click

fourth is binding

you have to go back

fifth nothing

Sixth, there he is, playing the sixth fall in to a false set

first is set, second is set, third also set

fourth, now yes

gives some counterotation

wait a second, because this tensor

It does not allow me to move well

start again, the first, second is set

third makes a click

anything fourth, fifth nothing

sixth is binding

there it is, several clicks and falls into a false set

first is set, second is set, third is set

fourth, now yes...

It gives counterotation, helped him return

and set

sixth has jumped

there it is, what we set it again and false set returns

placed is set, second

third is set

the fourth is the shortest

It goes way down

practically I can not touch it, seems set

and by touching the fifth

would open

Well, as you can see no greater difficulty, as I say

only you need a sufficiently small pick to move into the keyway

let's gut it

and see what is inside

Let's go there

Well this would be what it has inside, there are a couple of springs not want to leave

the bible is quite full fat

the plug, as you see, has nothing special

six chambers

and the pins would be

all key pins are normal, brass

and the drivers all would be normal with tapered ends

except the fourth would be a spool

which it is the only one that gives some game

the springs are all the same

Well, this would have been the AZBE HS6 opening

I hope you liked it, you find it useful and thank you very much for your time, a greeting

For more infomation >> 133 AZBE HS6 DIMPLE GANZUADO SPP & GUTTED SUB ENG - Duration: 8:12.

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Tác Bạch Cúng Dường Lễ Vu Lan -Báo Hiếu .Tại Chùa Phước Long Cái Cao - Duration: 7:10.

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Allegri no teme perder a Dybala, objetivo del Barça - Duration: 2:04.

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New Jurassic Park Mobile Command Center Lego Jurassic World 11 Hybrid Surprise Eggs Mutant Freaks - Duration: 16:52.

New Jurassic Park Mobile Command Center Lego Jurassic World 11 Hybrid Surprise Eggs Mutant Freaks

dinosaurs whoa some of these guys are really creepy looking keep watch

New Jurassic Park Mobile Command Center Lego Jurassic World 11 Hybrid Surprise Eggs Mutant Freaks

with giant Lego surprise eggs Wow let's see what we got up there is one of them

and what's this we have more in another one

wow this thing is really packed check that out we have for them already

hmm that's is there's anything else Oh another one okay Wow there really

can't be anything else what another one okay that's really good

what oh boy we've already have seven I see okay this is getting ridiculous

but hahaha there's another one

and another one what is this the magic mobile command Wow how did all these

eggs fit into there I don't know what let's go ahead and open these eggs up

and create some awesome Lego you guys okay guys let's start building our

freaks from the giant dinosaur toys surprise eggs Wow

our first one is going to be wow we got a lot of carts here what is this guy

gonna be okay so t-rex body the Rex head

indominus rex leg t-rex leg t-rex tail but for its arms is going to have two

Velociraptor bodies ha ha ha check this guy out

awesome talk about a freaky looking dinosaur wall those hybrids really went

wrong there Oh guys once we're all done we'll go

ahead and set them up here on this awesome mobile Jurassic Park command ok and

then here is our next three hybrid dinosaur what will it be wow those parts

make no sense

that is the point ok so looks like we've got Triceratops body

we've got Velociraptor in indominus legs and for its head we have a

Velociraptor body oh boy this poor guy doesn't know if he's coming or going

he has no way to see you must use radar or something

also if you guys do enjoy these videos please put in the comment section what

other freak ones you'd like to see next or you know what other kinds of Lego or

dinosaur toys you want to see review also okay so what are we supposed to do

with this this looks like a total mess

let's see it looks like okay we have

Dilophosaurus body block Raptor head and um this Rex legs in for the bot for the

arms we have two Velociraptor bodies wow this is a freaky looking guy it

looks like a terminator or something check them out haha those look like guns

his arms look like they're guns cool okay let's see what our next freak

is going to be okay and then here is our next three claw okay

this one looks totally confusing guys wow do I even remember how to put this

together I hope so indominus rex body t-rex head

t-rex tail and then for the legs we have two Velociraptor bodies check this out

cool that's some cool legs man so his legs could bite you

hahahahaha free awesome and then for the arms you've got to

blossom after body actually one Velociraptor one Dilophosaurus body ok

check this freak out Wow what I want this guy coming after me ok and there we

go well this guy's not very tall and who is our next trick here is our next one

okay that looks confusing to let us see so a Velociraptor body a blue

glossa Raptor leg a red Dilophosaurus leg ok so its arms are actually two

Velociraptor heads Wow get in front of this guy his arms and

his head will bite you with the Dilophosaurus head okay cool and our

next also hybrid Dino is going to be kind of confusing okay

t-rex body indominus rex tail indominus rex legs it's looking pretty good so far

and then wings Hey and then a tiny little and office right head and green

Velociraptor arms okay so this guy is huge but his bite is tiny but could he

fly he's got wings I don't know if it's Dinosaur Toys too big to fly or not okay and our next

awesome hybrid is going to be okay so what are we supposed to do with that

okay dominus Rex body and little tiny t-rex

head or its arms it's got Velociraptor legs on t-rex tail

t-rex legs but where do the rest of those parts go this one is a

double-decker so the rest are going to be growing out of his top so los wrap

their body indominus rex head growing right off the top of this cap okay there

we go so which one of the heads does the

eating Wow I don't know okay and our next giant hybrid Dino is

so giant at all okay Triceratops body t-rex head in the lava

leg indominus rex leg Velociraptor leg and a Dilophosaurus leg this guy

actually looks like a puppy dog so now what I want this puppy dog around my

house might accidentally eat and our next awesome dinosaur toy is going to be

okay this one looks more simplistic a small t-rex body joining indominus rex

legs and indominus rex it okay so this one looks almost like a bobble head or

something are they cool hybrid is going to be my Velociraptor body

legs

winds and Johnny t-rex head so this one almost looks like a flying puppy dog Wow

you'll see this guy coming at you okay and then we've got one final hi first I

know let's see you an N okay I don't need no

words to start with this guy he's got three tails

I guess his tails are going to be his arms okay and one tail in the back so

one is an actual tail and then he's got odd t-rex body indominus rex leg another

t-rex leg and for a head and wings she's got a pterodactyl cool check that out so

you've got a little tiny oh sorry I've got a little tiny pterodactyl head haha

could he fly I don't know okay guys now comes the fun part we get to set up this

park mobile command with our awesome hybrid Lego dinos ah if you

haven't seen this I did a full review on it guys go ahead to my Jurassic Park

playlist and awesome that guys it came out when

lost world came out that right there is a kind of s but this is a

really awesome set guys so make sure you go ahead and check it out there so you

go ahead and open up this back trailer here and it's time to start setting up

our dinos in this awesome dinosaur zoo first we've got the big guy here with

the block the Raptor arms could go right over there and then our freak

double-decker Hybrid can't go right over there next our three light legged what

you my can go over here right in the lab and then this poor guy who can't

see if he's coming or going will go right behind the big guy over

here and since this one's got wings we're going to go ahead and put it on

top like a flew right on top there and this one also has wings so this one's

going to go on top here you can put it without it falling and then this little

weird-looking guy here it's gonna go right over there and then this guy with

the big leg the big head put the tiny little body is gonna go over here

right / - its sumac this guy also has wings so he is gonna go right up over

here and then this little puppy dog would right over there fighting the

trailer and an hour last freaky-looking wrong this guy scares even me I mean

poor guy how's this guy supposed to run I have no idea

I mean his legs are longer than his his arms a longer than his legs okay guys

that was a lot of fun let's check out some of the awesome hybrid dinos that we

made wow this is genetic engineering gone totally wrong wonder if they're

going to use these dinos in world to hole possibly okay guys I had a

lot of fun making this for you guys and if you did enjoy it please go ahead and

click like drop me a comment guys I love reading your comments I will answer soon

as possible is if you have any suggestions put it in your comments

because I have followed suggestions of a lot of my viewers so you guys are very

important to me you guys are awesome that awesome audience I love making

these videos for you guys this is my job guys so

I just want to thank you guys because I really do appreciate the help you've

given me and if you enjoy these da knockoff dinos I'll put a link below the

video where she could buy them thanks for viewing and I will you guys that was

a lot of fun and if you enjoyed the video make sure you click Subscribe and

the thumbs up button down below the video in today's secret word is the word

go ahead and put that in the comment section down below the video on those

you remember my club look to the video ends there's an awesome incurred

sophomore fun video click the boxes below for a lot more fun videos and if

you want to see even more go ahead and click the subscribe button

For more infomation >> New Jurassic Park Mobile Command Center Lego Jurassic World 11 Hybrid Surprise Eggs Mutant Freaks - Duration: 16:52.

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North Korea in the Age of Trump - Running Out of Strategic Patience - What Can Work? - Duration: 1:13:26.

I see people are still filtering in but we're a little bit behind schedule so I

just like to get moving thank you for joining us in this session

which has been titled let's see running out of strategic patience rethinking US

policy toward North Korea now because we are discussing US policy clearly it was

a good idea not to invite any Americans to serve on panelists because Americans

have been heard from I actually mean this quite seriously especially in

Washington we hear from the the same few Talking Heads myself included all the

time and there's there's only so much any of us can can take so we thought

that perhaps we would look beyond the Beltway so I'm very pleased to introduce

the three panelists who I will quiz grill torment flattered

what have you over the next few minutes we have Professor Andre Lanka from

Cookman University in Seoul andreia Berger formerly of the Royal United

Services Institute in London now of the center for nonproliferation studies

which is also my organisation if I didn't introduce myself I'm Joshua

Pollak editor of the non-proliferation review which is part of the James Martin

center for nonproliferation studies and now so is Andrei although she is still

hiding out in London so we get her here when we can and Gina Kim

dr. Kim is from Qaeda the Korean Institute of Defense analyses in Seoul I

think it is a major oversight in these discussions that we do not include our

South Korean allies in these discussions I want to say we I mean of course

Americans these conversations have a if certain insularity to them if you

like although we often refer to the desires of our allies and the

requirements of assuring our allies we have our own conversation about that and

rarely ask our allies what they think they become strong men or stocking

horses if you like choose your idiom so why not ask directly now I know that

that no one person can represent an entire country but it's a start

so with that if you will permit me to abuse the moderators privilege I'm going

to try to get you all caught up a bit on on the North Korean nuclear issue just

to get us all on the same page so this will take a little longer than it ought

to maybe but I think it will pay dividends in our conversation so let's

review North Korea first made a commitment to denuclearization jointly

with South Korea at the end of 1991 start of 1992 under a bilateral

agreement with the United States called the agreed framework they froze their

nuclear program is including the plutonium production reactor at Yongbyon

they didn't give up any reprocessed plutonium they sort of kept it in their

hip pocket the thinking was we would get to this issue or perhaps North Korea

would collapse or what have you but it was considered more important to freeze

the operation of the reactor and the construction of two larger reactors they

also froze missile tests and space launches a few years later the Bush

administration having determined that North Korea was circumventing the agreed

framework at a minimum by developing an enrichment program withdrew from the

agreed framework in 2002 and ceased providing aid to North Korea under its

terms North Korea withdrew from the nuclear non-proliferation treaty in 2003

as the United States was preparing to invade Iraq and although it reaffirmed a

denuclearization commitment in 2005 during the so-called six-party talks in

Beijing in 2006 they ended their space launch and missile

s moratorium they conducted their first nuclear test North Korea has now

conducted five nuclear tests dozens of theater missile tests and a handful of

satellite launch attempts two of them successful so they have put objects in

low-earth orbit this has been the Sputnik moment it's now fairly clear

that even if their space launchers would not be particularly good ICBMs they they

have with a light enough payload the ability to serve in that role renewed

efforts at diplomacy have taken place this didn't happen all at once the Bush

administration in about 2007-2008 had a series go and at a freeze this involved

a program of disablement that froze the facilities at jung-hyun and and more

than froze them it actually disabled them physically so it took a while to

restore them this this course of diplomacy ended in disagreement over

verification issues the Obama administration had to go with this in

2011-2012 which produced each February 2012 leap day deal and that was also a

freeze freeze of missile tests freeze of the facilities at Yongbyon in exchange

for some aid it quickly came unwound in a disagreement over whether space

launches were covered there have been no substantive exchanges

between the United States and North Korea since then and especially since

the third nuclear test which took place on February 12 2013 the eve of President

Obama's State of the Union address the next month in response the

administration announced that it was shifting resources away from a European

BMD program ballistic missile defense toward an expansion of ballistic missile

defense assets in Asia and the Pacific the administration has progressively

stepped up sanctions they've designated Kim jong-un individually as a human

rights violator and in the last year in 2016 we've seen a step change in the

sanctions regime and this is this is the UN sanctions regime not just unilateral

actions for a decade it was focused narrow

on restricting activities that countries believe were linked to proliferation and

and luxury goods I should add now it has expanded to include sanctions on North

Korean export commodities including coal and steel and North Korea's logistical

and financial sanctions sectors rather so the the pressure side of what has

been described as a two-track policy pressure and engagement has loomed

larger and larger in the Obama years the Obama administration position was that

North Korea must demonstrate that it is sincere about any future talks by

freezing all aspects of its nuclear program for the duration of any such

talks that's a demand that implicitly extends beyond young beyond to any

facilities that perhaps may exist but haven't been declared North Korea for

its part has rejected preconditions for renewed talks and is called upon the

United States to face up to the reality of the growth of North Korean strategic

capabilities and and what North Korea calls the hostile policy there have been

periodic rumblings of discomfort with this approach the last Director of

National Intelligence James clapper and public remarks last October said I think

the notion of getting the North Koreans to denuclearize is probably a lost cause

they are not going to do that that is the ticket that is their ticket to

survival they are under siege in their very paranoid so the notion of giving up

their nuclear capability is a non-starter with them he also said in

the same interview we're kind of running out of gas on sanctions since we've

imposed most of them that we can now in the same period

by contrast the p5 plus one group negotiated the jpoa and then the jcpoa

with iran this was a two-step process that backed Iran away from the nuclear

precipice it's not directly analogous to North Korea since the Iranians are

within the NPT they've never produced to sell material that anyone knows about

but the concept was similar first there

was freeze and activities that that any

activities that could have rapidly enabled fissile material production that

created space for the talks and that led to a long-term agreement so the question

in my mind is can the Trump administration approach North Korea in a

similar spirit the signals are mixed Secretary of State Tillerson in Seoul a

few days ago said let me be very clear the policy of strategic patience which

means basically trying to wait them out and wait for the North Koreans to change

their mind the policy of strategic patience has ended we are exploring a

new range of diplomatic security and economic measures all options are on the

table Reuters this morning citing a senior

American official reported that the administration is considering sweeping

sanctions aimed at cutting North Korea off from the global financial system as

part of a multi-pronged approach of increased economic and diplomatic

pressure especially on Chinese banks and firms that do the most business in North

Korea plus beep beefed up defenses by the United States and its South Korean

and Japanese allies now to the ears of many experts this is not a new approach

this is perhaps a next incremental step in the Obama administration's policy for

the last several years so my question is is a new approach possible and what

would it look like to start this conversation I'd like to turn to

Professor Liang cause the author of many books editorials commentaries you name

it on these questions his biography is in the program which is on your mobile

devices so I will not worry with it and aundrea will simply ask you in your

recent publications you have advocated a freeze stopping short of a demand for

denuclearization upfront what's the advantage of that approach well this is

a very BETT approach problem is all as a approaches even worse because it

probably I would start from disadvantages are freeze what do I mean

by face in agreement when the United States and other

interested parties implicitly accept North Korea as a nuclear state without

openly saying so it goes otherwise it would be kind of loss of face so this

agreement will have to be officially packaged as the first step on a very

long way to denuclearization actually actually it would be an agreement

according to this agreement North Koreans would agree not to test

nuclear weapons and not to conduct missile launches and of course we will

accept a lot of money they always demand money they never do anything for free

and probably some political concessions and what is bad about this approach

essentially it creates a dangerous precedent

it will mean paying the blackmailer and of course those Koreans will keep a

significant number of nuclear devices of nuclear balance however what are the

ultimate ease sanctions do not work and highly unlikely to work many of you

probably presume that North Korea is a starving country on the verge of

collapse well it's a very poor country but they would describe the last five

years under Kim Journal as a period of mild economic boom in North Korea they

are growing growing very fast because they're quietly dismantling what is left

of the old Stalinist I would say hyper Stalinist economy and basically doing

what change did in the early 1980s without officially admitting it and it

works economy is improving quite fast in spite of the sanctions of course it's

important a China is not supporting the sanctions but China also faces a very

unpleasant choice China doesn't like North Korea nuclear adventurism but they

understand that in order to make any difference they have to push really hard

and a hot from Chinese likely to provoke a grave

domestic crisis inside North Korea they don't want to give is in Syria like

situation in a nuclear-armed country nearby which is understandable so

they're sort of cautious plus of course they don't want

unification of Korea under Seoul government which is likely to be

democratic nationalistic premier so Chen is not going to be supportive sanctions

are not going to work negotiations wonderful but North Korean

government belief that they are under grave threat they saw what happened in

Iraq they saw what happened in Afghanistan and they especially they saw

what happened in Libya because they remember that Colonel Qaddafi was the

only strong man in recent history who agreed to negotiate to surrender his

nuclear weapons development program may be very underdeveloped but still program

in exchange for the economic promises of economic advantages and back then many

US diplomats said that North Korea should learn Libyan lessons

yes this is exactly what they did so chances are basically I would say just

plainly zero to reach generalization and if such an imperfect deal is freeze

becomes impossible and right now I don't see much enthusiasm on the American side

about such a deal which is understandable because it's a bad deal

as I suppose however what will happen North Koreans will walk to achieve the

second strike of ability they do have it and they will probably not stop they

will work hard to improve the delivery system to improve their nuclear weapons

maybe they will be more activist proliferation maybe not all the time

they'll tell difficult to say but at anyway it's going to be even worse this

is a painful problem and the only long-term hope is that North Korea will

gradually change or collapse it's switch is still possible indeed but for the

time being they are around and I need to stay around especially giving

their economic achievements they are likely to stay around for quite a while

right well is that really so bad can't we live with the North Korea that has

second strike capabilities can we use the proliferation Security Initiative to

try to stop any attempts to export sensitive goods how painful is this

problem that you project if we don't well it's painful but I'm afraid we

don't have it any choice if you have to leave this with North

Korea which you have second strike capability if they are very lucky if

negotiations start today and if North Koreans are going to sell their second

strike capability for a sufficient price and I don't think they are going to do

it right now but if they are going maybe it can be prevented but most likely they

will get the second strike capability and then start negotiations and well we

don't have choice really like it or not they'll have to live with them now can

we live with them like that okay but can and we live with North Area as a mature

nuclear power can we just say it isn't worth it to deal with them let's just

bind together more tightly with our allies and and go from there

they have said we have no choice I don't see any any oh we can just keep ignoring

them but it will be creative create even greater problems and they will still be

around talking to them or not talking to them we will have to live with them and

we're obviously better off if they don't have various capabilities yes or even if

they said there are some ways to control proliferation and to keep the

advancement that some under some control people the objection I always hear to

this this recommendation goes something like this

and I will try to do it justice since I have mixed feelings about it myself

me too

if we reach a freeze with the North Koreans they will get ready for their

next test and when they're ready to do it they'll unfreeze

they'll pocket whatever goodies they personally mean

I and and we'll just have marked time and and we'll look like fools what what

do you say to this objection it should be an ongoing agreement you will look

like fools because you will be fools if you give them what they demand in one

large package it should be ongoing small payments or everything or if it's some

kind of political concessions these concessions can easily be they worked

they worked if they basically don't give their side of angry okay well the North

Koreans you know have have indicated that they would be willing to stop

conducting nuclear tests specifically if the United States and South Korea would

stop conducting the annual combined exercises they're actually held twice a

year in our handling right now is that a concession that the United States and

South Korea should entertain I know not probably yes but it's not going to be

enough I let's face it they are not going to sell the advancement of nuclear

program for such a cheap price they will demand much more in terms of political

concessions and above all money they always ask for money money you know oh

maybe it can be palpated in kind not necessary money industrial equipment

food each other for free oil shipments whichever okay with that in mind

Andreea I'd like to turn to you we just heard the following categorical

statement sanctions do not work and I know that you've studied this issue

closely so tell me why that's wrong tell me what what sanctions haven't we

attempted today I might have a meaningful effect on the North Koreans

either from a perspective of inflicting pain and coercing a change in behavior

or preventing them from getting their hands on sensitive goods

well thanks Josh let me maybe a caveat and Andres assessment so that

sanctions don't work and I'll start by saying I think that assessment that

sanctions don't work is really most often put forward in relation to the

high-level objective for the sanctions regime that we publicly set out which is

to encourage the North Koreans to come back to the negotiating table and

eventually denuclearize and in relation to that assessment I broadly agree that

sanctions as currently implemented haven't materially advanced us towards

that aim with North Korea I think it's also worth having a debate about whether

or not that's a realistic objection objective for the sanctions regime to

have and you know it seems to me that there's emerging consensus within the

expert community and indeed as Josh was saying within the intelligence community

that denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is now a vanishingly remote

possibility so setting up that as an objective for sanctions might be in

itself a policy complication and a senior US official once said to me which

I thought was was really astute observation if the objective for a

sanctions regime isn't realistic or feasible then sanctions are just there

to make us feel good about ourselves and that's something that's maybe worth

talking a little bit more about in this context because we seem to be at a

moment of kind of life crisis in North Korea policy and in the Western

community particularly as it relates to sanctions I'll caveat this further

however and by saying that you know that's the high level objective for for

the sanctions regime but there are subsidiary and intermediate objectives

for sanctions that are also still really really important and thinking things

like preventing North Korea from selling dangerous military technology overseas

which it does all the time and prohibiting and so or preventing insofar

as possible North Korea from accessing critical technology for its prohibited

programs from abroad disrupting North Korean illicit networks and activity

overseas where those are taking place those are kind of intermediate

subsidiary objectives that are really important because even if they only work

five percent of the time or 20 percent of the time you need them to still be

there you need those sanctions to be there for those purposes

and similarly you know every interdiction is intrinsically valuable

every North Korean network disrupted is intrinsically valuable and however poor

the implementation gaps that exist are and that takes me on to my second point

which is actually coming to Josh's question about what additional sanctions

would help improve effectiveness and the unsexy answer is that actually a really

implementation of existing measures which are sweeping as as we were

describing the the sanctions regime has expanded a lot in the last year and but

it still suffers from a globally poor implementation record and this does not

just apply to China it's pretty much across the board I can't think of a

single sanctions measure putting coal which I think is too early to tell to

one side and I can't think of a single sanctions measure that enjoys robust

global implementation and enforcement and that we put up at the UN level I

can't think of one and and what that means is as I've written before that

what we're creating in sanctions terms is a sieve and we're expanding that

sieve but without taking the time to ensure that countries have the domestic

legal frameworks and the internal policies in place to fill the gaps in

that sieve and and that's really where we need to spend our time like I said

it's politically unsexy but is the fact of the matter now this takes us to

briefly a conversation of our secondary sections because there are two ways I

think that you encourage countries to start filling the implementation gaps

they have and you can do that through carrots or sticks on the sixth front I

think it's pretty inevitable that the Trump administration is going to move

for secondary sanctions we're seeing the reporting about that today I think

there's a role for secondary sanctions in encouraging China and indeed others

to take more seriously their UN obligations to implement sanctions on

North Korea I have opinions that I'd be happy to to share and maybe in a

response to a question about what those secondary sanctions maybe should or

shouldn't look like but I think there is a role for them

it is important however that we don't forget the carrots part of this because

it's not always going to be possible to sanction not implementing countries from

a policy perspective some of these not implementing countries are our friends

and as a consequence we need to make sure we're talking about capacity

building and those types of activities as well Andrea let me jump in there

you're talking about the broad global picture when you talk about sanctions

implementation how much does that matter when an estimated 80 percent of North

Korea's trade is with China certainly to hear President Trump this is all about

what the Chinese will or won't do and he's not alone that and you'll hear that

from from a lot of people in the expert community you mentioned China of course

in the context of secondary sanctions but to what extent is this just a

question of finding the keys to China's heart one way or another again and let's

remember that Andrei has already said they're just not going to go that far so

so do we need to have the conversation about the Tanzania's of the world yes I

absolutely absolutely think we do and there's there's two reasons for that

really and the first comes back to that point

about objectives right and if we're talking about general pressuring on

North Korea and that yes China's at the forefront of that and other countries in

trade terms matter less but four subsidiary objectives and the other

countries matter a lot if you've got several countries in the Middle East

buying ballistic missiles from North Korea if you've got North Korea using

whole parts of Africa as havens to conduct illicit trade through and from

and it is really important to make sure that those countries are the focus of

our attention and we can't forget them in the discussion over China and I fear

that too often we do but the second point is that yes China accounts for

North Korea's access to the world both inward and outward in terms of flow of

trade there are countries beyond that and so I take for example sanctions over

iron and one of the things I've been looking into

a lot of that trade gets recorded as China's the customer when in fact when

you look at company level data you see that what's happening is Chinese

companies are buying some of these products turning them around probably at

an increased price and selling them overseas to other countries and so you

know there are even in just the trade space there's some of those dynamics

going on that means we have other countries that we need to be talking

about indeed Malaysia's brought this to our attention I think in the last few

weeks of life in more than one way yeah well let me turn to to Jeana we've just

heard this suggestion that if we were we the United States were to engage North

Korea in pursuit of a limited agreement that they would expect they have North

Koreans we would expect and to combine military exercises variety of other

political concessions among their other demands as I'm sure you know is an end

to the Korean War armistice replacing it with a peace treaty how do you think

this process not to mention any outcome like that would be received in South

Korea does it does it matter who's in office who's in government since we're

very poised to go to elections can can we generalize about how South Korea

would would respond and how it would act in response to this course of action

well South Korean government has never refused

talks on for example a peace treaty because in 2007 after the inter-korean

summit there was a joint statement if it clearly stated that the two Koreas will

work on peace regime on the Korean Peninsula along with along with

denuclearization efforts and also a South Korea as a part of six-party talks

endorsed a joint statement in 2004 which all

to confirm the same approach talking about peace arrangement in a separate

forum and South Korea also initiated so-called Korea formula exploring new

ways to talk with North Korea in reaching out to other six-party members

for seeking such an opportunity but one thing is clear any talks on peace treaty

should be done with an a I think peace treaty can be done with non-nuclear DPRK

that's very clear from South Korea's position because we have so many

furloughed hurdles in front of us because for example we have different

ideas about denuclearization because North Korea thinks denuclearization as a

removal of us umbrella from South Korea and also withdrawal of USFK from from

the Korean Peninsula and in 1964 when there was a general meeting North Korea

actually mentioned three conditions we'd roll of all foreign troops from from the

south and termination of military alliance and arms reduction between the

two Koreas I think North Korea repeats the same thing over and over and over

but this has original original implications because signing a peace

treaty means ends of end armistice treaty right and that may undermine the

basis of un commanding on Korean Peninsula and also it can undermine the

basis of heat raagh u.s. alliance because the UN fee function is

monitoring the armistice so it's going to be gone and it can and undermining

the Rogers alliance can also affect the role of US forces in Japan because the

crews function is supporting all the logistics assistance to the USFK in

Korean Peninsula so I'm not sure if the of the US government is ready to accept

this kind of in original chain and another issue that I'm very

concerned about is the sequence of action because verification takes very

very long time so the question is when we signed a peace treaty before the Vig

or after that to get our DV yes on complete verifiable irreversible

destruction of North Korea's nuclear program that and that comes from from

one of the UN resolutions are those yes and the resolution on clearly mentions

that kind of verification but we have we have seen the history of non-compliance

on North Korean side because North Korea refused to apply environmental sampling

for example and refused to open up suspected sites because it was

undeclared to the international community and we have seen seven times

the North Korea underreported it's a path plutonium activities so we have the

kind of concern and we are very much concerned about the possibility as

professor and Leung Kuk mentioned the rich Graham may not be really committed

to denuclearization because nowadays North Korean representatives speak about

arms control rather than denuclearization in our international

fora and they also mention six-party talk or denuclearization is dead so

that's if we are going to pursue this goal and the endpoint should be very

much clear that's denuclearization of North Korea's nuclear program then South

Korea and may support it okay so if that principle is made clear could North

Korea support a long-term freeze that would create the space for that or even

let's say in hushed tones even pursue unification before denuclearization well

actually you mentioned the freeze for fries idea well putting a moratorium

qiyamah actually prevents North Korea from conducting R&D research and

development and it cannot stop North Korea from extracting

fissile materials from its nuclear facility including HEU facility which we

don't know where it is and you cannot stop North Korea's developing like

Professor Lancome mentioned second striker capability because North Korea

can continue for example he Shields has were engine tests on the ground and we

cannot verify all of all those activities indeed and actually we agree

South Koreans agreed to this idea of fries for fries agreement in the past in

1992 we can actually canceled our joint military exercise which was called team

spirit but that still was totally different at the time we agreed to this

moratorium thing I'm sorry this freeze for freest thing because at the time we

we could see that the recruit ratify NPT and then dirt Korea agreed to accept ia

inspection on the ground so it looks probably different deal but nowadays

North Korea is calling us to in our joint military exercise just aboard

putting a moratorium on its nuclear and missile tests see so you would you see

no value to freeze you see it is not even slowing them down I'm not talking

about the value of this approach I think it's meaningful if there is any

verification measure to be applied in each step because I think verification

is the key but I'm more worried about the possibility that this kind of idea

can undermine the existing sanctions regime as under andrea emphasized

because well it can we can see that we may lose momentum of pressuring North

Korea because it is because of the UN Security Council resolutions especially

two to three to one specifically mention that moratorium is not some

not another subject for a compensation because article 2 specifically mentions

North Korea has to put moratorium on its nuclear and missile tests and 40 article

44 49 also mentions that if there is another missile or on you know nuclear

test there will be additional measure on North Korea so you know I think well a

South Korea's position is quite clear if this freeze for freeze process can be

the first step of the whole package of cvid the South Korea may support this

well we've now had two conservative administrations in South Korea everyone

at this point is expecting that moon jaein

will probably win the election and that this will usher in some renewed version

of what was called the sunshine policy I like I'll have the moonshine policy not

not to be dismissive but just to be cute if that means a willingness to engage in

joint economic activities willingness to have summit meetings again and to seek a

reduction of tension and of course to pay a lot of money do you think that

would also be reflected that continent style of approach to North Korea would

also be reflected in a different attitude towards the denuclearization

objective well currently it's a protocol party is going through primary races and

according to the recent survey like you said mr. Gwen jaeyun is the front runner

and I hear lots of concerns about the possible change in South Korea's

position on North Korea but let me tell you that he had an interview in December

last year and he amplified actually three things first alliance

second sanctions third denuclearization because he said alliance should be the

pillar of our security and democracy sorry diplomacy and he also mentions as

dirty of nuclear status increasing the Alliance significance of the Alliance is

also increasing and about the sanction he also mentions sanction is the tool to

bring North Korea back to the negotiating table and he also emphasized

denuclearization should be the ultimate goal of any kinds of talk even between

inter-korean talks so you see more continuity than change yes yes of course

because sometimes he talked about long term goals so such as visiting Pyongyang

or reopening gassing industrial complex but he also at the same time talk about

certain conditions in the intensive consultation with the US China Japan as

well before pursuing these goals and also a verification of purification and

sanctions as well and he also mentions that lifting sanctions on South Korean

side will go along with lifting sanctions at the international level so

I think to a certain degree you can see a continuation of the policy toward

North Korea when it comes to nuclear issues what I'm more concerned about is

a China factor because these days China is clipping toward North Korea on many

issues soon right what's that I'd like to open it up to the audience please use

the microphones on on the stands and state your name and organization before

your question I'll recognize you in mine soon as my eyes of a justice go ahead

sir Greg Tilman boarded the arms control Association I would be curious to get

your reactions to the Fed regional ballistic missile deployments underway

in South Korea and we had an interesting comment this morning from Chris Ford of

the Trump NSC in talking about Russia and China's reaction which of course we

know has been quite vehemently opposed but Chris Ford said that there was a an

easy and constructive way for them to react to help pressure North Korea to

move toward denuclearization to get a grip on it that way which brought to my

mind of course the the last time Russia and China cooperated on

non-proliferation was to get the Iran nuclear agreement which we succeeded in

getting moving the threat out 10 to 15 years there's been no Iranian long-range

ballistic missile tests and the US missile defense deployments in Romania

and Poland were not delayed by a single day in spite of the fact that that the

projection was radically different now than it was when the whole missile

defense deployments were made so my question is is there a reason for Russia

and China to believe that the US would remove fad if they cooperated more on

North Korean non-proliferation and like take sorry I have exactly the same

question but in hey you may be different on the same subject

go ahead maybe we can go ahead Lorelai's asking indeed well first of all my name

is Carla treaty I'm from Italy if you suffer international in Rome yes I was I

was going to raise also the question of of that of the deployment of THAAD which

in my opinion is the new evolution in the strategically on in the Korean

Peninsula something that disturbs enormous ly both the Chinese and the

Russians and who therefore would be more than willing to put some pressure on the

DPRK to give up its nuclear programs in exchange of a removal of the deployment

of THAAD now there is I think a domestic implication in all this because indeed I

think that if Democratic Party wins the elections in

Korea that party you know as let's say the promoter of renewed sunshine policy

will probably not be very in favor of the deployment of that in India in the

DPRK so indeed I think that the deployment of that can be a bargaining

chip in view of a possible solution of the nuclear issue I would like to have

comments on that time so it seems to me that the questioners have asked

essentially would China and Russia being a physician to pressure the North

Koreans what assurance would they have that that would go and I would answer

this under what conditions with the US withdrawal sad

I wish Chris Ford were here to answer that but anyone who wants to take a

swing at that Andrei I'll maybe start with just a my initial reaction to both

of those questions which is but I think it depends where that pressuring and by

Russia and China would actually take the North Korean missile program to and

because that's ultimately what that is about from a defensive perspective is is

trying to make sure that there's a defensive possibility against the North

Korean missile threat and it's insufficient to trade away or even

suggest that you would trade away vmg deployments unless you actually see a

tangible and verifiable reduction in that missile threat so simply doing that

in exchange for Russian and Chinese cooperation that brings and brings

nothing or not enough on the North Korean front isn't sufficient when

anyone like to anything today well I probably would add that China

unfortunately to have very valid reasons as I have said not to be tough on North

Korea and probably it was an American expectation there

sub deployment would sort of poof China - taking a hard stance on North Korea

but as I have said China faces a very unpleasant choice actually three options

either a nuclear North Korea this is brinksmanship and adventurous

current situation China doesn't like but if they push hard they will face

domestic crisis maybe revaluation as I have said Syria like situation in a

nuclear country in MI or unification if it results in essentially takeover by

South Korea of these three options gianna clearly profuse the first option

and it's not going to push hard enough and looking is what happening with

thought arm well it's now China is essentially never as a unique situation

being the country which is sanctioning both South and North Korea and however

however as somebody who lives in South Korea I'm not sure whether moongeun and

his left-leaning government which is indeed likely to yes to emerge soon I'm

not sure whether they will take a really critical attitude to sort because right

now deployment is quite popular a deployment is quite popular with the

South Korean public who see it as a defensive measure and they are

remarkably annoyed by the Chinese reaction first time in the same era

probably I see how Korean nationalism which is always my device again Japan

sometimes against United States in some quarters of the society this time first

in my memory to analyze the gauge chain increasingly so I see it by reaction of

my students for example so I'm not sure whether the left-leaning government will

cancel deployment maybe years but I'm not sure to my mind

China thinks us-china relations is the independent variable whereas its

approach to North Korea can be dependent variable so here's China it's more

concerned about the implications of a sad deployment which can be can can have

some links to more US presence and influence in this region so that's why

Chinese China Chinese scholars talk about the possibility that South Korea's

defense missile defense system can be integrated into u.s. and the food

defense system and the possibility of using that especially the radar to

monitor all the movements along the coastline of the mainland China we have

so many times defended our position to to reduce any anxiety on China side but

by saying that that issue can be resolved was the denuclearization can be

possible on the Korean Peninsula because South Korea has little leverage on the

decision of deployment of that because that is u.s. strategy assets right and

we have have consultation for many many months about this deployment and it has

been intensively discussed and and there is some understanding about the

importance of that and especially for a defense aspect and we South Koreans also

developed KMD Korea air missile defense but we with the target state of

accomplishing this capability is needed to 2020 so it's going to take time for

South Korea to develop our own defense no done before defense system so in the

in the meantime I think we need such a strategic assets on on the Korean

Peninsula as well and I think the Liberal Party may have a different

opinion but I can say the mr. moon jaein acknowledges the

significance of the airlines as well as the importance of the fad deployment but

they create size somewhat different issues which is a procedural matter

because there was not enough consultation with other neighboring

countries especially with China and also the government did not pay much

attention to the public opinion and did not spend much time to discuss this

matter openly with the leaders in South Korea I noticed that you used the phrase

strategic assets a couple of times once to characterize that and once more

broadly and there have been calls in South Korea for the United States to

station strategic assets in South Korea but I haven't seen the meaning of that

phrase explained exactly do you have a sense of what is meant by that precisely

well people are very concerned about South Korea is seeking a third option

for example like going nuclear or something like that but the problem here

is not just about the increasing threats of affair from North Korea if those key

issue is credibility of u.s. extended deterrence power of the South Koreans

ask for something you know more aggressive measures like for deployment

of tragic assets to increase the credibility of us extended deterrence if

the credibility is strong I think there is no way the South Koreans will talk

about going nuclear because we made a deal in the past in

1970's exchange of you know the nuclear option with us umbrella provided to

South Korea so we are actually at the in the defense side we have discussed so

many things to increase us extended deterrence through a consultative

mechanism such TSC deterrence strategy committee in EDS

cg extended deterrence strategy consultation group through this kind of

dialogue we developed tailored deterrence against North Korea and part

of it was we talked about assessment of North Korean threats and we talked about

what what requirements are there and what kind of assets that we need also we

also discuss our various scenarios not only actual use of threats but also

immediate threats and threats of use by North Korea so we are having all kinds

of discussions - as an ally I'd like to turn back to the audience and maybe we

can take one from each side can I just ask that you keep any comments brief and

ask a question yes Ralph Cossa from the Pacific forum CSIS and Honolulu brief

comment and a question on dad in our strategic dialogues with the Chinese

we've provided extensive briefings on how it has virtually no impact on their

second strike capability my guess is the Chinese are using that to try to

pressure South Korean politics and I would agree with Andre that it's

backfired my question though is on two words that haven't been used regime

change if we're convinced that the North Koreans won't give up their nuclear

weapons and we're likewise convinced that the US and particularly dissidence

tration is not prepared to live with them then should we be putting the topic

of regime change on the table I don't mean marching on Pyongyang I don't mean

by military means but there are certainly economic political and

psychological operations that you could have that would be clearly stated at

removing Kim jong-un is that a thing we should be talking about now

thank you and from this side Terrell's main stars reporter with Foxtrot alpha

is a Defense national security blog question is how destabilizing do you

feel that hawkish and language of the Trump administration is in the South

Korea side in regards to how Pyongyang will take it it seems to

me that have any regime around the country that Pyongyang seems

particularly sensitive to hawkish rhetoric and I want to know if that

alone does complicate matters and then also how effective ultimately do you

feel that that system would be functionally based on my understanding

many of our missile defense systems are only measured against one missile / 1 1

missile pretty much so basically it's not as if Pyongyang ëthey decided to

launching missiles they're not just going to just launch one and just wait

to see what else is going to happen right and so I wonder if it's more

symbolic or you know how usually I work about what that system be thank you okay

well why don't we start with with the regime change question that this this

issue of well subversion essentially can is it is it feasible to subvert the

regime through through information penetration and other means and what

would those means be I believe it's feasible and it's surprising how little

has been done and probably I would put it in a slightly different way not

necessarily from change but regime transformation because I like right now

we see that Kim jong-un in spite of many problems began to Enosh basically

implement for Chinese did in the early 1980s in the long run even under Kim

jong-un's watch such a theorem is likely to be less risky because they will be

much interested in setting running shoes across the globe and it will make them

less interested in you know creating crisises and being engaged in

brinksmanship and of course of course regime change is also an option because

in both cases we have to keep in mind that North Korea is extremely vulnerable

because South Korea exists the gap between North and South Korea per capita

income gap is the world's largest gap between two countries which share red

border it's if you believe the optimist since 1 to 14 if you believe the

pessimist is 1 to 30 for comparison gap between East and West Germany was

between 1 to 2 and 1 to 3 so it's a huge difference and you know just introducing

the formation of the outside world can encourage both revolutionary and

evolutionary changes inside North Korean society because people will learn about

other ways of life as a waste around society and they will definitely start

Excel ask the simple question why not to try it and we have two options the

current regime can basically bow to the pressure and start introducing reforms

it's what they actually doing they can do it even faster and they believe that

even now they are doing it exactly because Kim Jordan is aware that people

are gradually learning about life outside the borders and they can become

discontent so to count 8 he has no choice but to start some changes aimed

at economic growth and improving the limit standards or if he is not fast

enough well it might end with evolution which probably not the most desirable

option but well well at least the things of the new creation or anyone else like

to chime in man no well the other question is well how does yes yes I have

a something to say actually one of my recommendation for the government was

having multi-dimensional pressure on North Korea we talked about dime

approach diamonds diplomacy information military and

economy in terms of a military aspect of it I think we have to make sure that

North Korea thinks that arms race continuing our series is too costly and

in terms of economy we can't we should actually tighten the existing sanctions

because there are lots of loopholes now so we have to close that loophole at

this point because of a for example we you utilize sorry we should utilize

casual mechanism which is to band any item that can be possibly used for a

developing nuclear and missile program should be banned and it should be listed

on the sanctions list then everybody everyone can actually abandoned of items

because I tracked all the nuclear missile related Australia items than

North Korea export imported imported from the rest of the world for the last

five years and I have a list of those items mostly from China but we can

actually do that by doing so by doing our strengthening sanctions North Korea

may find find in the situation where they can cannot put investment in R&D of

the other programs and also we should continue diplomatic isolation and also

we have to especially try inflow of information to North Korean society so

that we can get get the North Koreans know what's really going on from the

outside so multi-dimensional pressure will will change the leadership's

calculation about in about this point so but what about the other gentleman's

question concerning how the North Koreans react to hawkish language coming

from the Crump White House are my own views on this but I'd like to hear yours

first I think you cannot overdo North Koreans when it comes to hawkish

language right just go to any website of North Korea and read what they write

about the outside world about United States about South Korea where the

relations are relatively good so they are not going to be surprised of course

they will react with saying with a usual kind of rhetoric which sounds a bit

comical I advise you to have a quick look which

well basically recollect in our unfortunately here from Washington but

multiplied by maybe my ten fifteen so well it's not that I like what is said

here I don't but I don't think it makes any

difference they are not the type of people who are going to be offended by

such expressions can I just jump in there i I take that point fully and I

think that language and indeed other types of language that are coming out

right now including mixed messages unclear messaging about what the

direction of regional policy from the United States towards Northeast Asia

looks like and but also particularly on the North Korean nuclear and missile

issue the Tillerson visit in my view has had all of those things and you know

harsh statements unclear statements mixed statements and the combinations

for me is what's concerning not just because of how that might be read or not

read in Pyongyang but actually by others in the region I also have a concern in

the longer term that actually and that public messaging that very visible

signaling happens without a ongoing official dialogue with North Korea and

let's say we're going into the future in a scenario when North Korea is able to

hold us continental United States targets at risk with a nuclear weapon

crisis management is going to be pretty essential in that environment indeed I

think it's essential now and without a dialogue ongoing that that public

rhetoric is going to be what we have between the two countries to discern and

what the crisis management situation might look like that's actually it's

interesting to see in our history nerds are reacted to all this negative

rhetoric coming from Washington and then they things that if they have to do

something to prove their delight to the outside world and one of the favored

two-term that North Korean diplomats use when they are

criticizing us approach to North Korea is axis of evil and so that means North

Korea is very critical about any kind of this negative dialogue especially that

I'll the the reverie targeting it's the leadership because leadership is the you

know the keeping in that society yes yes again so what what I'm very much

concerned about is the way to the way the North Korean may react to this

because according to dirt occurs law on consolidating its status as a nuclear

weapons of state they have the kind of law and article 4 actually mentions when

there is any violation of its sovereignty the Korean may may attack

may use force against the enemy but here I'm it is not clear whether violating

sovereignty means violating territorial sovereignty or political sovereignty

because they are very critical about you have hostility which is targeting the

only regime which means no violation of the sovereignty so that kind of logic is

very dangerous to me the other question was about the effective to subside I can

take a very brief stab at that the main advantage that missile defense will give

you against a large arsenal of missiles is it will buy you some time

because eventually you will run out of interceptors so whether or not it's

effective immediately is is always subject to debate but but in the end you

you will run out of shots and so what you have gained is the ability not to

have to react instantly but and that's mainly it from my perspective I think we

have time for one more round of questions I don't want to hold you in to

the break so from from the ciphers hi thank you very much Sebastian Bergson

Williams from basic in London I just wondered if the panel could speak

briefly on possible trusting confidence-building measures between the

US South Korea Russia and China and

particularly on fad and what's stopping TTP ends happening at the moment because

it I can think of a couple of things like inspections of sad sites or radar

systems or or joint control perhaps but perhaps there are other things I haven't

thought of I'd be very appreciative thank you yeah

hi I'm Christina very Ali from the Royal United Services Institute yesterday we

heard the phrase satiric MC mentioned and I wondered to what extent this can

be applied to the North Korean context it's quite easy to find evidence whether

that's from the acid acts of evil or from somewhere else as to what it at

least initially drove North Korea towards nuclear weapons whether that's

the same reason they maintained today is a different question but should the US

or any members who were involved in the six-party talks take that approach with

North Korea should we have some kind of tribute empathy and if so how do you

communicate that to the regime in Pyongyang is that something they're

going to listen to it is that's we're going to trust it's like really really

interesting your thoughts on that so in a way we've got a question about the

great power interactions on one hand and and be great power interactions with

North Korea on the other hand and there's this question can we move past

ICBMs to T CBMs I think there is a certain thematic similarity here we'd

like to start maybe I'll just start with Deb's question and I thought one of the

things that was most encouraging this morning from Chris's comments was at

least and the willingness to have a discussion with the Russians and the

Chinese about the conditions in which a I think he said more interesting

discussion over dad could be and ballistic missile defense could be had

and that is I can get least a positive indication indeed one of the things I've

taken from so many panels at this conference is that in the midst of all

this political disarray communication is going to be hugely important and having

ongoing dialogues is going to be a the importance between a variety of

different countries and for that same reason I took some encouragement from

that statement this morning so at least starting there and would be would be

really useful I think I'm not sure necessarily that site visits and things

like that are going to have the confident confidence building value that

and they site visits might have in a broader arms control context and partly

I think because Chinese fear is at least about the system's deployment are about

where that leads what what's to come what does it mean for broader u.s.

intent to put defensive assets in the region etc and site visits don't really

help you with that longer-term vision but I think the starting point is

probably to talk about it and have more communication over in what circumstances

there could be a rollback in those assets do you want to address the

question of strategic embassy with with the DPRK Cristina I think knows a lot of

my thoughts by virtue of having sat across a desk from me for a number of

years and but I think is I distinguish the Kim Jong Ling period in this and

that affects my willingness or decreases my willingness to have much strategic

empathy for the North Koreans right now because I think of a much larger portion

of the reason why North Korea maintains nuclear weapons today and is pursuing

them in the way that it's pursuing them is because of Kim jong-un personally and

the domestic politics around him he relies extraordinarily heavily on the

nuclear and missile programs and their development for his personal legitimacy

in the security situation for North Korea it's very much about Kim Jungman

personally too I always take a note now when Kim jong-un does singing and

releases handwritten notes authorizing nuclear tests etc that type of imagery

that's coming out of that type of propaganda suggests me that this is much

more about personal legitimacy than it may be once was everyone else like to

time ago my probably I would agree with andreas remark because if you will

control the north koreans are doing under Kim jong-un it usually makes

perfect sense but sometimes it looks like that he's I

would say excessive in he is overdoing many policies which basically you can

understand but sometimes he is basic he is giving too much attention and

spending too much times like basically with the nuclear issues he is really

seriously committed to it as or some other policies we can basically see the

same in many cases kiss kiss personality and he's basically irrational his

binomials paranoid I would never give a description of paranoia to him they're

very rational people but sometimes well even paranoids have enemies not

basically in their situation well she has very little choices but sometimes he

is sort of you know taking this his promotion and it's not the only case

when it's happening unfortunately one thing that I can add to that is the fact

that North Korea mentions choocha quite often than before

especially from January of this year to chiming self-reliance and dirty air

calls the recent past missiles answering missile engine tests as a one of the

majors therefore it with developing detailed weapons selling light weapons

that means North Korea is very determined to go his own way okay well I

think it's about time to conclude but I would just like to before thanking the

panel ask the panelists to give us one last thought that they'd like to

conclude on can be anything you like perhaps you'd like to end on an

optimistic note since this has been so glum really not me no no I'm not

surprised I mean you come in and advocate a policy that you call a bad

policy so so anyone else I'll start I think for me one of the key challenges

for DPRK policy moving forward is that in our kind of I don't want to use

pillars because pillars is a loaded term in the in the nuclear field but in terms

of the key kind of policy line so if you've got deterrence and assurance and

you let's say you've got sanctions you've got

encouraging societal change in North Korea you've got diplomacy pursuing any

one of those significantly further results potentially now and trade off

across other policy lines so let me give you an example of what I mean here and

pursuing the deterrence and assurance side of things further and particularly

if we get to the stage where North Korea has demonstrated an ICBM capability

pursuing that further is going to probably irritate the Chinese to the

note to no end to the point that they might withdraw from any thinking about

cooperation on North Korea rather than determining that it's more in their

interests for them to cooperate but you still need them on the sanctions side if

you want to pursue sanctions further to increase the effectiveness there at the

same time pursuing sanctions further might undermine your effectiveness in

encouraging societal change in North Korea that creates expectations amongst

a middle class that flow upwards so we're at the stage where I think are not

as getting further tangled and and careful nuanced diplomacy is going to be

pretty important to make sure that we avoid that as much as possible Trump

administration and careful nuanced diplomacy you are not Gina I think at

the u.s. and the South Korea should work on in the future more detailed a roadmap

for a denuclearization with specific timeline because North Korea offered its

own idea last year in July and that offer also included such as removal of

older strength nuclear strategy assets from South Korea

and opening up all the US bases in the southern part and and US making pledge

of no use of nuclear weapons as well as a no threat of use of nuclear weapons

sources as well and demonstration of no demonstration of strategy gases around

the Korean Peninsula I don't think that can be well accepted by either the US

where is South Korea so we should work our own our own demands with a specific

timeline and on that note please join me in thanking our panel

For more infomation >> North Korea in the Age of Trump - Running Out of Strategic Patience - What Can Work? - Duration: 1:13:26.

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Leave your chest unbuttoned to the navel after giving birth - Duration: 11:36.

For more infomation >> Leave your chest unbuttoned to the navel after giving birth - Duration: 11:36.